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BOARD LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL 
FIRMS: A TEAM PRODUCTION APPROACH 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: Boards’ involvement in strategy is generally seen to be an 
indicator of board effectiveness but less is known about the relationship between 
board leadership and strategy involvement, especially in small firms. This study 
analyses board leadership from a team production perspective as an antecedent to 
board strategy involvement in small firms.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using survey data from 140 small firms in Norway 
collected in two different time periods, we demonstrate that leadership behaviors and 
processes have a greater impact on boards’ strategy involvement than structural 
leadership characteristics alone.  
Theoretical/ Academic Implications: The study provides empirical support for a 
team production perspective on boards. Our data show that: 1) board members’ 
knowledge, board development and board chairperson leadership efficacy positively 
influence boards’ strategy involvement, and 2) chairperson leadership efficacy 
enhances boards’ strategy involv ment under structural conditions of combined 
CEO/chairperson leadership and changes in board composition. These findings 
expand the traditional understanding of structural leadership conditions. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study offers insights to small business owners 
and managers on how to improve the strategy involvement of boards. For policy 
makers, the study has implications for the content of codes of good governance 
practice relevant to small firms, specifically in relation to board development 
initiatives and board evaluations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most research on corporate governance and boards has focused theoretically and 
empirically on large corporations (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Gabrielsson & 
Huse, 2004). Whilst research in small firms has grown substantially, relatively limited 
attention has thus far been paid to their boards and governance structures (Fiegener, 
2005; Fiegener, Brown, Dreux & Dennis, 2000a, 2000b; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 
2000). There is, however, an emerging consensus that boards in small firms may 
constitute an important organizational asset (Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001; 
Gabrielsson, 2007), that boards can add an important strategic dimension to small 
firms (Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund, 2007; Fiegener, 2005; Zahra, Filatotchev, & 
Wright, 2009) and that small firm board and governance structures can influence firm 
value creation (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Huse, 2000). 
Extant research identifies both differences and similarities in corporate 
governance and boards in large and small firms. In large corporations, assumptions 
about separation of ownership and control along with divergent utilities of managers 
and shareholders sharpened the focus of research and governance practice on the 
monitoring and control role of boards (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Daily et al., 2003; 
Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). Whilst agency problems are also relevant to the small firm 
context, decision-making and control structures here are less complex and diffuse 
compared to large firms resulting in a comparatively diminished boards’ monitoring 
role (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The type and content of boards’ 
service and strategy tasks also vary between small and large firms (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), and at different stages of small firms’ life cycle (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 
2003). Finally, the impact of founders and/or key entrepreneurs on boards and 
governance may be greater in small firms compared to large ones (Arthurs, Busenitz, 
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 3 
Hoskisson & Johnson, 2009; Nelson, 2003). Recently, scholars have explored what 
makes boards active and effective in task performance, including research on the 
range of tasks boards perform (Pugliese et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel, Van Gils & 
Voordeckers, 2005). In trying to answer questions about the determinants of board 
effectiveness, researchers have increasingly paid attention to board team processes 
and behaviors rather than structural characteristics of boards alone (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999), using direct observations and/or primary 
data rather than relying on traditional archival methods.  
  Focusing on board team processes, we investigate the effects of board 
leadership in small firms on board strategy involvement. Only a few studies have 
examined the role of board leadership in small firms and these tended to explore the 
antecedents and performance outcomes of structural leadership characteristics such as 
CEO duality (Daily & Dalton, 1992; 1993; Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton, 
2002). Our study extends that body of knowledge by drawing on a team production 
approach as a novel theoretical perspective to investigate board leadership processes 
in small firms. By focusing on how leadership relates to small firm boards’ strategy 
involvement, this paper also aims to respond to calls for more theoretical and 
empirical research on determinants of strategy involvement (Fiegener, 2005; Kim, 
Burns & Prescott, 2009).  
 The article is structured as follows. Following a brief introduction to the literature 
on board strategy involvement in small firms, we outline our theoretical approach and 
derive hypotheses. We then discuss the methods used including our sample, variable 
measurements, data collection and analysis methods. Following the presentation of 
our results, we discuss their implications for research and practice before concluding 
with areas for further research. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Board Strategy Involvement in Small Firms 
Research on boards’ involvement in strategy has been prolific (Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Golden & Zajac 2001; Pugliese et al., 2009) for a 
number of reasons. First, boards’ involvement in strategy is increasingly viewed as a 
core contribution to firms’ value creation processes (Demb & Neubauer, 1990; Judge 
& Zeithaml, 1992; Pugliese et al, 2009) despite some evidence to the contrary (Hitt, 
Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). Hence, research into boards’ strategy involvement has 
been motivated by the need to understand the links between board and firm 
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001). A second and related reason is that the debate on active versus 
passive boards has coalesced around boards’ strategy involvement as a key 
differentiator between these (Castro, de la Concha, Gravel & Perinan, 2009, 
Pettigrew, 1992; Rindova, 1999). McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), for example, argue 
that an active board does not just ratify and control strategy, it is also involved in 
formulating strategic decisions as well as defining and shaping which decisions are to 
be taken in particular contexts. Thus, boards’ strategy involvement may be seen as a 
key indicator of board performance and effectiveness (Stiles, 2001). Third, boards’ 
strategy involvement is a complex multi-dimensional construct and has been 
approached from a range of theoretical perspectives (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; 
Pugliese et al., 2009). This theoretical pluralism has presented both opportunities and 
challenges for empirical research and the practical implications derived from it 
(Pugliese et al., 2009).  
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 Despite the impressive advancements in knowledge in boards’ strategy 
involvement, some unanswered questions remain. Not only is the empirical evidence 
on boards’ strategy involvement inconclusive, there is a lack of empirical studies 
investigating the phenomenon in contexts other than large Anglo-American boards. 
Some notable exceptions notwithstanding (Fiegener, 2005; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 
2000; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), we lack knowledge on antecedents of boards’ 
strategy involvement in small firms. Entrepreneurship and small business scholars 
have long called for research not only on the content but also the process of strategic 
decision-making in small firms (Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 1999; Sandberg, 1992). 
Further, the role of teams and leadership in strategic decision-making processes in 
small firms is not yet fully understood (West, 2007). This paper builds on team 
production approach to boards and governance (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & 
Englander, 2005) to address these gaps. 
 
Board Dynamics in Small Firms: A Team Production Approach 
Small firms are often characterized by concentrated ownership, and the 
appropriateness of agency theory as a theoretical lens in such contexts has been 
questioned (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2001; Uhlaner, Floren & Geerlings, 2007). 
When relaxing assumptions about managerial opportunism and the separation of 
ownership and control, we need alternative theoretical perspectives to explain 
governance phenomena and board behaviors (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). One 
such alternative is the team production theory of the firm (Blair & Stout, 1999; 
Kaufman & Englander, 2005). The seeds of team production theory sprang from 
microeconomics when Alchian and Demsetz sought to explain cooperative behavior 
of individuals in work teams vis-à-vis opportunism and shirking, and the emergence 
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of hierarchies in response to team production problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; 
Blair & Stout, 1999). Whilst the micro-economists provided the basic tenets, it was 
the later contributions from other disciplines, including law and sociology, that 
fleshed out team production theory (Blair & Stout, 1999; Blair, 2005). In the 
contemporary team production perspective, firms are conceptualized as a nexus of 
team-specific assets, invested by shareholders, board members, managers, employees, 
and other stakeholders who hope to profit from team production (Blair & Stout, 1999; 
Gabrielsson, Huse & Minichilli, 2007; Kaufman & Englander, 2005). As such, team 
production theory has resonance with resource-dependency theory and a stakeholder 
perspective, but resolves the decision-making and rent-allocation ambiguities inherent 
in these theoretical approaches by introducing the concept of a mediating hierarchy 
(Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005). Instead of explicitly contracting 
with each other in order to determine their share in team production, team members 
surrender decision-making powers on the allocation of duties and rewards to a 
mediating hierarchy. In doing so, the mediating hierarch’s function further extends to 
“encouraging firm-specific investment in team production by mediating disputes 
among team members…” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 772). In a firm perspective, the 
mediating hierarchy function is performed by the board which at the apex of the 
firm’s decision-making mediates between all team members that have invested firm-
specific resources in order to encourage team production (Blair & Stout, 1999). 
Consistent with Blair and Stout’s (1999) notion of several levels of mediating 
hierarchies in firms, the board in itself is also a team that co-produces values (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999). In countries with unitary board structures, the board comprises of 
both executive (or inside) and non-executive (outside) directors, each one of which 
brings different knowledge and skills to the board team as well as representing 
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different interest groups on the board. In the context of the board, therefore, the 
mediating hierarchy role theoretically rests with the board chairperson (Kaufman & 
Englander, 2005).  
  In the context of small firms, the overlap between ownership and management, the 
lack of a formalized managerial structure, as well as the need to bring critical 
resources into the firm (Arthurs et al., 2009; Cowling, 2003) make the team 
production approach a useful theoretical lens for understanding boards, especially the 
determinants of strategic involvement of boards. Following the logic of team 
production theory, boards are viewed as cooperative teams that contribute to firms’ 
value creation through their strategy involvement. Each board member brings specific 
and firm-relevant knowledge to the team, a key characteristic of team production 
approaches (Kaufman & England r, 2005). Board leadership is about effectively 
facilitating the presence and the use of firm-relevant knowledge and skills of board 
members (Huse, 2007). Further, boards are social systems, the effectiveness of which 
is determined by how board members share knowledge and interact (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999; Leblanc, 2005). Board leadership therefore also includes the design of 
effective interactions in boardrooms by means of rules and instructions as well as 
having skilled chairpersons exhibiting leadership behaviors.  
 To summarize, following a team production perspective we argue that board 
leadership is not a single-dimensional but a multi-dimensional construct. It includes 
processes for ensuring board members bring relevant knowledge to the boardroom, 
the design of interactions that facilitate the use of knowledge and skills, as well as 
chairperson leadership behaviors that maximize team production. In that line of 
argument, board leadership is a major determinant of board strategy involvement and 
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a central mechanism to bring out the board’s value creating potential (Gabrielsson et 
al., 2007; Leblanc, 2005).  
 
 Board Members’ Knowledge 
A key issue of board leadership is to ensure that board members have relevant 
knowledge (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The provision of 
knowledge and skills may directly influence firm’s value creating capabilities, 
especially if such knowledge is firm- and industry-specific, including knowledge of 
critical technology and industry’s characteristics, competitors’ main features, and 
product/market developments (Kaufman & Englander, 2005). Furthermore, board 
members’ knowledge can prevent ‘process losses’ associated with highly 
interdependent and episodic teams and help board members to mutually build on each 
others’ professionalisms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In other words, board members 
‘must elicit and respect each others’ expertise, build upon each others’ contributions, 
and seek to combine their insights in creative, synergistic ways’ (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999: 496).  
 Boards’ knowledge and skills are particularly relevant in small firms for two 
reasons. First, small firms are typically characterized by a scarcity of resources, 
especially financial and managerial ones (Brunninge et al., 2007; Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004). Board members’ knowledge and skills that are firm-specific can therefore 
supplement the firms’ internal knowledge and skills base provided by managers. 
Board members’ knowledge and skills can also be a way to secure the provision of 
advice and new ideas more cost efficiently compared to hiring external consultants. 
Second, small firms often exhibit a dominance of entrepreneurialism over 
managerialism, with emphasis on action orientation and real-time strategies 
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(Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Thus, boards in small firms will typically be concerned 
with giving timely and substantive support to the firm’s CEO and other top executives 
who often lack wider competences and experiences (Borch & Huse, 1993; Minichilli 
& Hansen, 2007). In this context, board members’ knowledge may act as a substitute 
for top executives, who may not plan strategic actions in a structured way (Lynall et 
al., 2003).  
 Board members’ knowledge has already been investigated as a determinant of 
board task involvement. Pugliese & Wenstøp (2007), for instance, found that 
knowledge of board members in small firms is positively related to the boards’ 
involvement in strategic tasks. Minichilli & Hansen (2007) found that board advisory 
task involvement is related to knowledge, but also that these relationships were 
moderated by the event of crisis. Based on the arguments above we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive relationship between board members’ knowledge 
and board strategy involvement in small firms.   
 
 Board Development  
The team production approach highlights the problems of shirking and the need to put 
board members’ knowledge and skills to use (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & 
Englander, 2005). The presence of knowledge per se does not imply that board 
members will use their knowledge (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
There is thus a need for board leadership and board development to ensure that the 
knowledge and skills are properly used (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). We define board development as the processes which facilitate board 
interactions, board working style and utilization of board member’s knowledge. As 
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such, board development consists of regular board development programs, board 
instructions and board evaluations to increase board involvement (Conger, Finegold & 
Lawler, 1998; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch, 1995). The practice of such board 
development allows board members to get involved in various board activities and 
tasks (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). Further, such initiatives are a way of turning a 
collection of individual directors into the working group of a board team (Leblanc, 
2005), in other words, facilitating team production. Consequently, the process of 
board development is believed to exert a strong influence on board task performance 
(Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000).  
 Board development is particularly important in small firms for three related 
reasons. First, small firms are often characterized by a lack of formal structures and a 
dominance of informal processes (Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007). While informality 
may give flexibility, it can also increase uncertainty among board members and 
centralize decision-making in a way that hampers long-term strategic development. 
Formal board development processes can thus give structure to the strategic process in 
small firms and facilitate a greater involvement by board members. Second, 
governance in small firms is often characterized by role integration (Johannisson & 
Huse, 2000) and division between various governance tasks are not always evident 
(Cowling, 2003). In small firm boards, formal instructions and evaluations may help 
to define board members’ tasks and to clarify the relationship between the 
chairperson, the board members and the top management (Conger et al., 1998; 
Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Third, following the team production logic, board 
development processes are essential in order to transform a collection of individuals 
into a team that is collectively involved in strategic decisions. Theoretically and 
empirically, this logic is heightened in a small firm context where we are more likely 
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to encounter small boards led by idiosyncratic entrepreneurs inclined towards 
individual actions and behaviors (Arthurs et al., 2009; Fiegener, 2005; West, 2007). 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between board development and board 
strategy involvement in small firms.  
 
 The Chairperson’s Leadership Efficacy 
The individual who has the greatest ability to shape board leadership is possibly the 
board chairperson (Leblanc, 2005). Roberts et al. (2005) argued that the role of the 
board chairpersons is “vital to the board members’ engagement in various ways”, and 
“their own conduct does much to set the culture of the board” (p. S15). As proposed 
above, the board is a social system and it contains board members with a mix of 
personalities, skills and motivation that may influence how they individually and 
collectively engage in board task performance (Huse, 2007). The chairperson’s 
leadership behaviors have the potential to influence board effectiveness.  
 The basic premise of the team production approach is that the productivity of any 
board member is greater as a result of the interaction with other board members 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). To secure positive team outcomes, the board 
chairperson is expected to lead individual board team members in order to “… meld 
the board into a cohesive group, and to make each individual director feel that he or 
she is equal” (Huse, 2007: 201). As Leblanc (2005) pointed out, it is doubtful that a 
strong, engaged board will have a weak chairperson or that an ineffective board will 
have a strong and skilled leader. In practice, board chairpersons range from effective 
to neglectful, from domineering to self-serving.  
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 The board chairperson’s leadership efficacy is particularly relevant in the light of 
the peculiar characteristics of the board of directors. Since the board is a group with a 
mix of personalities and relationships, there is increasing amount of interest in how 
the chairperson actually leads the board’s work (Furr & Furr, 2005; Leblanc & Gillies, 
2005; Letendre, 2004; Dulewicz, Gay, & Taylor, 2007). While the CEO leads 
employees in everyday company settings, the board chairperson is the one motivating 
and leading the board. Hence, the chairperson’s role can be portrayed as that of an 
orchestrator of an elite group of individuals which meet episodically (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999), and whose competences and knowledge need to be coordinated, 
integrated and developed towards team efficacy (Wu, Tsui & Kinicky, 2010).   
 From a team production perspective, the chairperson’s leadership efficacy may be 
an especially important determinant of board strategy involvement in small firms. 
Boards in small firms are characterized by a relative scarcity of resources, or inputs to 
team production (Cowling, 2003), because of their small size and common dominance 
of internal board members. Daily and Dalton (1992) argue that board leadership is 
likely to be especially visible and important for coordinating the scarce resources 
towards creating an effective board in small firms. For instance, in addition to leading 
the internal board work, chairpersons in small firms are particularly important in 
securing efficient management of external network contacts (Borch & Huse, 1993). 
This includes gaining the legitimacy that small firms sometimes lack compared to 
their larger counterparts (Davis & Pett, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965). Further, there is 
typically a greater amount of concentration of power in the hands of one or a few 
individuals in small firm boards. These individuals tend to be both owners and board 
members in small firms (Brunninge et al., 2007; Eddleston, 2008). To facilitate board 
members’ involvement in strategy in the midst of this concentration of power in small 
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firms, scholars have argued that an important feature of the chairperson’s leadership 
efficacy is to create a positive board climate where all board members are encouraged 
to contribute (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). In such a context, the chairperson’s 
leadership efficacy can be viewed as a competence that supplements and/or 
coordinates substantive board resources (Collis, 1994; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 
2006).  Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive relationship between the board chairperson’s 
leadership efficacy and board strategy involvement in small firms. 
 
Moderating Influences of Board Structure 
We argued that leadership efficacy of the board chairperson is of particular 
importance in a team production perspective. Given this prominence, we further 
explore the importance of chairperson leadership under two contingent structural 
conditions typical for small firms. The first is when there is CEO duality, i.e. when the 
CEO of the firm is also the board chairperson; the second is when there has been a 
recent change in board composition.  
 A main theme in the literature about board leadership is CEO duality (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson. 1998). Advocates of CEO duality argue that it is useful to 
reinforce the leadership structure of the firm by providing ‘unity of command’ and 
mitigating ambiguity about key responsibilities (Anderson & Anthony, 1986). 
However, agency-theoretic arguments imply a separation of the two positions (Coles 
& Hesterly, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The CEO duality discussion has been developed in the large firm 
context where monitoring and control tasks of the board have been prioritized, often 
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under pressure from shareholder activists distrustful of managerial behavior (Rechner 
& Dalton, 1991). Yet even here agency-theoretic arguments for the separation of 
CEO/chairperson roles are disputed. Theoretically, stewardship theory contests both 
the assumptions and prediction of agency theory and proposes instead CEO/chair 
duality (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Empirically, there is no conclusive evidence of any systematic relationship between 
CEO/chairperson leadership structure and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). 
Conceptually, the CEO duality debate is pre-occupied with the monitoring tasks of 
boards with relatively less attention being paid to boards’ strategic involvement 
(Conyon & Peck, 1998; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel & Bierman, 2010; Uhlaner, Wright 
& Huse, 2007).  
 Contextually, small firms differ from the large ones in several important ways, 
including more concentrated ownership structures and role integration, making CEO 
duality a much more common phenomenon in the small business setting (Cowling, 
2003; Daily & Dalton, 1993). Recent research into CEO duality in firms with high 
levels of strategic, or concentrated, ownership supports the argument that in such 
contexts duality positively impacts firm performance (Chahine & Tohme, 2010). 
Our argument, however, is not about CEO duality per se, rather we are 
interested in how the presence of CEO duality affects the relationship between chair 
leadership efficacy and board strategy involvement. We proposed that in team 
production theory, the leadership efficacy of the chairperson, that is chairpersons’ 
behaviors aimed at melding the board team, is positively related to boards’ strategy 
involvement. An additional theoretical argument from team production is the need for 
a mediating hierarch to resolve actual or potential decision-making ambiguities (Blair 
& Stout, 1999). Under conditions of CEO/chairperson separation, this mediating 
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hierarchy role is more ambiguous compared to conditions of CEO/chairperson duality. 
Put differently, in small firms with CEO duality, the chairperson is more likely to 
have the ability to affect organizational change and development (Daily et al. 2002). 
Board leadership thus becomes more pronounced and capable of impacting the 
board’s strategy involvement in small firms where there is CEO duality (Daily & 
Dalton, 1992). We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  In small firms with CEO duality, the positive relationship between the 
leadership efficacy of the board chairperson and board strategy involvement will be 
strengthened. 
 
A second contingent situation relat d to board leadership is that of recent changes in 
board composition. From a team production perspective a change in board 
composition, regardless of the nature (insider/outsider balance) of such a change, 
creates a discontinuity in the board team dynamics. New and old board members alike 
require socialization into the re-constituted team in order to develop trust, and to 
understand and accept the working style of the board. As a consequence, a change in 
board composition may temporarily reduce team production. We expect this argument 
to be particularly relevant in small firms. To a greater extent than in large firms, 
boards in small firms tend to be characterized by people who have close and trust-
based ties to each other, such as family and friends (Brunninge et al., 2007). Boards in 
small firms also tend to be smaller in size than in large firms (Gabrielsson, 2007). In 
small firm boards composed of a small group of people with strong ties to each other, 
we can expect that routines are established with regard to the board’s role in strategy 
(Johannison & Huse, 2000). From a team production perspective, these two 
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characteristics of small firm boards are likely to mean that a change in board 
composition constitutes a considerable emotional event for board members with 
implications for their ability to perform their roles (Brundin & Nordqvist, 2008). In 
other words, the change in composition has a negative impact on board strategy 
involvement because the change is dramatic enough to disrupt the working style of 
board. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a negative relationship between recent changes in board 
composition and subsequent board strategy involvement in small firms. 
 
Building on the previous arguments about the nature and impact of leadership efficacy 
in boards, firms that have experienced a recent change in board composition have a 
stronger need for a leader whose behaviors and skills ensure that the board continues 
to work as a cohesive team (Leblanc, 2005). A change in the board composition, 
regardless of its effects on the insider/outsider ratio in the board, accentuates the need 
for leadership efficacy to re-configure the boardroom culture and extend it to new 
board member(s) (Huse, 2007). From a team production perspective, the ‘social side’ 
of board work, for instance, to build personal relationships and to coach individual 
members to find their role in the new board and to make them feel confident to 
contribute is a key feature of the board chair’s leadership efficacy.  
 We expect the social side of board leadership efficacy to be particular important to 
weaken the negative effect of changes in board composition in small firm boards. This 
is because boards in small firms are generally characterized by an informal working 
style based on personal relationships and close ties between members of the board 
(Daily & Dalton, 1992; 1993). In other words, the role of the social interaction led by 
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the board chairperson to build trust and confidence among board members becomes 
pivotal to facilitate board strategy involvement in small firms, since there are few 
formal routines to rely upon. Thus, whilst changes in board composition may have a 
negative effect on boards’ strategy involvement (H5), we propose that this negative 
effect will be mitigated by the leadership efficacy of the board chairperson. We 
therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 6:  In small firms, the negative relationship between recent changes in 
board composition and subsequent board strategy involvement is positively 
moderated by the leadership efficacy of the board chairperson. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
The hypotheses are tested through a quantitative study based on survey data in 
Norway. The Norwegian governance system exhibits both similarities and differences 
to that found in other countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Historically, the state had 
greater influence in business affairs compared to Anglo-American countries, and this 
continues to manifest itself in government ownership, especially of large listed 
companies, and a strong regulatory regime affecting governance including mandatory 
women and employee representation on boards. But there are also similarities. The 
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance exhibits many commonalities 
to other international codes, including board structures and the division of 
responsibilities between boards, shareholders and management (NUES, 2010).   
Norway is also well known for its tradition of having small firms with active boards 
(Huse, 1990), and hence it is a particularly useful empirical setting for our research.   
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 The use of survey methods is motivated by the need to avoid reliance on 
secondary data as proxies for board processes, and follows calls to develop measures 
which try to capture actual board behavior (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hambrick, von 
Werder & Zajac, 2008). To this purpose, we designed a survey instrument based on 
established measures in the literature. Data were collected in two time-periods, 2004 
and 2005, through an eight page questionnaire where responses were collected from 
CEOs and chairpersons. The original questionnaire was sent in 2004 to a random 
sample of 3,000 small Norwegian firms that had, according to the list of Market 
Select, between 5 and 50 employees, and sales between 5 million and 50 million 
Norwegian crowns (or between 1 million and 10 million USD at the then exchange 
rate). We based our definition of ‘small’ on the official EU definition whilst using a 
lower limit of 5 employees to exclude micro-enterprises (European Union, 2003).  
 Market Select is one of several agencies providing data drawn from the Public 
Norwegian Company databases at Bronnoysund, which contain all Norwegian firms. 
We used the small firm data subset from Market Select, based on our definition 
above. There was no ex ante indication of the existence of boards in these firms. 
Responses were received from 973 firms, and 498 of these declared the existence of a 
board of directors. Of those firms, only 347 provided complete responses on all the 
board- related survey measures we used in our analyses, and fitted our size definition. 
The first survey was followed up by a second survey in 2005, including both 
responding and non-responding firms to the original 2004 survey. From these, we 
further filtered out ‘micro boards’ (those with fewer than 3 board members) since 
team dynamics could not be sufficiently grasped here. Following the above criteria, 
140 (identical) small firms with boards greater than 3 members replied to both the 
2004 and 2005 surveys and these formed the final usable dataset.  
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  The data used were responses from CEOs on behalf of the entire board. Since it is 
traditionally difficult to gain access to process data on boards of directors (e.g. Daily 
et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992), governance studies incorporating primary data are 
usually based on a single respondent, typically the CEO (e.g. Pearce & Zahra, 1991; 
Zahra, Neubaum & Huse, 2000; Zhang, 2010). In line with previous studies, we 
consider the CEO as the best possible key informant because he/she is knowledgeable 
about the phenomena pertinent to our study, and better placed than other board 
members to report on these. Furthermore, having multiple responses in some specific 
circumstances can enhance the risk of constructing averaged measures which reflect 
divergence across reports, rather than representing the constructs being investigated 
(Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993). In our case, we also collected responses from 
board chairpersons in the 2005 follow-up survey, but decided not to use these due to 
the nature of our research questions (re: chairperson leadership efficacy), and because 
using matched pairs would have reduced the size of our sample even further (49 
matched cases remaining). However, we conducted additional validity checks by 
testing for correlations between the 2005 CEO and chairperson responses in two of 
the independent variables (board members’ knowledge, and board development; 
chairperson efficacy was not tested for due to potential self-rating bias), and these 
were significant and positive.   
 In order to deal with common method bias (Doty & Glick, 1998), we applied a 
number of procedural remedies in the instrument development and data collection 
phase (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). First, we protected the 
respondents’ anonymity by assuring confidentiality of their responses in the cover 
letter that accompanied the survey. Second, we invested considerable time and effort 
in improving the scale items and reducing item ambiguity. All survey questions were 
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short, specific and used simple words to avoid ambiguous and vague formulations 
(Dillman, 2000). To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we 
conducted pre-tests (Fowler, 1993), including pilot surveys, interviews and 
boardroom observations, to assist us in the fine-tuning of the questionnaire and in 
identifying potentially misleading items (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Moreover, we 
carefully worded questions to minimize the likelihood of a social desirability bias, 
using inputs from the pilot interviews. All our questions were close-ended, but to 
reduce possible common method bias we used both five and seven point scales. 
 We also performed some of the statistical remedies for common method bias 
suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, we used Harman’s one factor test. The 
exploratory factor analysis of the items measuring all perceptual variables exhibits 
more than one factor with eigenvalues higher than 1.0, thus suggesting that the 
majority of the variance between the variables cannot be accounted for by one general 
factor (common method variance). Second, we used the partial correlation procedure 
to control for the effects of method variance (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). The results 
suggest that common method bias does not appear to be a problem in our data. Third 
and most importantly, in order to enhance the reliability of our measures, we averaged 
all perceptual measures in the two time points (2004 and 2005) in order to reduce the 
perceptual bias of the respondent (in our case the CEO). 
 
Variables and Measures  
Both dependent and independent variables are based on multiple-item constructs, and 
all items were measured through Likert-type scales.  
 Dependent Variable 
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Boards’ strategy involvement was measured using four items which represent the 
different aspects boards of directors are supposed to contribute to in relation to the 
strategy process. These measures were previously validated in other studies 
(Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). Accordingly, we used statements about the degree 
to which the board has been involved in: i) actively initiating strategy proposals; ii) 
making decisions on long term strategies and main goals; iii) implementing strategy 
decisions; iv) controlling  and evaluating strategy decisions (Minichilli et al., 2009; 
van Ees, van der Laan & Postma, 2008). The variable strategy involvement was 
computed as an index using the mean of these items. CEO responses from 2005 were 
used. The reason to use 2005 data only was to ensure that the dependent variable 
could be a result of the independent variables time-wise. The Cronbach alpha for this 
variable is .92. 
 Independent Variables 
The independent variables included in the study are board knowledge, board 
development and the chairperson’s leadership efficacy. While the dependent variable 
was measured in 2005 only, all independent variables are averaged measures of 
responses from 2004 and 2005 from the same CEO in order to reduce the perceptual 
bias. All variables have been computed by harmonizing the 5-points and 7-points 
Likert scales which were adopted in the 2004 survey and in its 2005 follow-up 
respectively, and by averaging different items for the three constructs as presented 
below. For board members’ knowledge we used a four-item construct based on 
Minichilli & Hansen (2007). The board members’ knowledge variable was measured 
by asking the CEO the extent to which board members have extensive knowledge on 
aspects such as: i) the activities of the key business functions; ii) the firm’s critical 
technologies and key competences; iii) the firm’s products and services; and iv) the 
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developments regarding the firm’s markets and customer needs. The Cronbach alpha 
for the final variable is .87.  The board development variable was operationalized as 
an average of four items in the questionnaire regarding initiatives that improve board 
interactions and working styles. The board development variable was measured by 
asking the CEO the extent to which the board of directors made active use of: i) board 
instructions (including rules for calls and agenda setting); ii) regular board 
evaluations; iii) regular board development programs; and iv) formal practices to 
introduce new board members in the board (Long, 2008; Huse, 2007). The Cronbach 
alpha for the final variable is .72. The board chairperson’s leadership efficacy 
construct was operationalized as the mean of three items related to the board 
chairperson’s way of leading board meetings and board work. The chairperson’s 
leadership efficacy variable was m asured by asking the CEO the extent to which the 
board chairperson was especially skilled in: i) motivating and using each board 
member’s competence; ii) formulating proposals for decisions and summarizing 
conclusions after board negotiation; iii) chairing board discussions without promoting 
his/her own agenda (Leblanc, 2005; Huse, 2007). The Cronbach alpha for the final 
variable is .83. 
 Interactions 
As to interaction variables, we computed the following additional variables. 
Specifically, the variable Chairperson’s leadership efficacy*CEO duality has been 
calculated as a product of the two originating variables, and the chairperson’s 
leadership efficacy variable was mean-centered to avoid collinearity. Similarly, 
Chairperson’s leadership efficacy*Change in board membership has been calculated 
from the two originating variables, and the chairperson’s leadership efficacy variable 
was mean-centered in this instance. Change in board membership has been computed 
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as a dummy variable, with value 1 if at least one board member had changed in the 
period in between the two survey observations, and 0 otherwise. Computing change in 
that way makes it a richer variable than computing absolute values in the difference of 
board membership since it also accounts for substitution effects, that is a board 
member being replaced by new one thus keeping the total number of board members 
unaltered, which are common. 
 Control Variables 
Boards should not be studied without paying attention to its context, and certain 
contextual variables are frequently used in board research (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In 
this article, we categorize contextual control variables in groups at different levels. At 
a general level, we controlled for industry characteristics, firm and CEO 
characteristics; at the board level, we controlled for the so called ‘usual suspects’ of 
board research (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
 Industry characteristics potentially influence strategy involvement of boards 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Haynes & Hillman, 2010), and this 
may be especially evident in high-technology firms (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 
2003). Accordingly, we controlled for industry characteristics by using a dummy 
variable (1= high-tech firm).  At firm level, we controlled for firm size, firm age, and 
also whether the firm is the parent company. Firm size and firm age are among the 
standard external controls, whereas headquarters are believed to potentially exert an 
influence on strategy involvement (Brunninge et al., 2007; Huse, 2000). The firm size 
was measured as number of employees, and a logarithmic transformation allowed 
adjusting for skewness. Firm age was measured as a logarithmic transformation of the 
number of years the firm had existed, regardless of its type of incorporation. With 
respect to CEO characteristics, we controlled for CEO ownership (Gabrielsson & 
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Winlund, 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zahra, Neubaum & Huse, 2000) and CEO 
tenure (Boeker, 1989; 1997). These factors are considered to influence board strategy 
involvement across CEO life cycle evolution (Shen, 2003). CEO ownership was 
measured as the percentage of shares held by the CEO, while CEO tenure was 
computed as the number of years the CEO had served in office in the firm. The items 
refer to the firms’ situation at the end of 2004 and all were taken from questions in the 
survey. 
 The controls for the ‘usual suspects’ refer to the traditional board demographic 
variables used in board research, and include the number of board members (board 
size), the inside/outside ratio, the board members’ shareholding and the CEO duality 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Board size was measured as the total number of board 
members (Zahra et al., 2000) with a logarithmic transformation allowing adjustment 
for skewness. For the inside/outside ratio we computed the insider ratio, measured as 
the percentage of inside executives over the total number of board members (Mallette 
& Fowler, 1992). Board members’ shareholding was measured as the ratio of board 
members’ shareholding to total shareholding, and it included shareholding by inside 
directors (Kosnik, 1987). The variable CEO duality was coded 1 if the CEO was also 
the chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table 1. 
 
- Insert table 1 about  here- 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation coefficients for 
the variables used in the regression analyses.  
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- Insert table 2 about here – 
 
Table 2 shows generally low levels of correlation among the predictors we used for 
the analyses and the dependent variable. Based on this preliminary analysis, we 
conducted VIF analysis after each regression to check for multicollinearity. VIF 
values range from 1 to 3, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our 
study (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996).  
 The hypotheses were tested through hierarchical multiple linear regression 
analyses. Before running the analyses we examined potential problems in the 
variables’ distribution with respect to the assumptions of hierarchical regression 
analysis. Residual analyses were conducted, but no results were found that changed 
the main conclusions. Statistical conclusion validity can be found, but inferences to 
causal relationship must be done with care when using cross-sectional without 
longitudinal data. Causal relationships will be discussed in the interpretation of the 
results. The linear regression analyses were conducted stepwise in order to capture the 
contribution of each set of variables to the model significance. When testing the 
hypotheses we thus combined the interpretation of F-change results in the linear 
regression with the beta coefficients in the models (table 2), and the correlation 
coefficients displayed in table 2. The results of the regression analyses are shown in 
table 3. 
 
- Insert table 3 about here – 
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Model I includes control variables related to firm and CEO characteristics. Model II 
includes board demographic controls. As expected, the coefficients are weak and 
aside from industry characteristics (high-tech firm coefficient: .17, t=2.05, p<.05) not 
significant. Model III includes the board leadership variables, and tests hypotheses 1-
3. As predicted, all three variables are significant with board development 
(coefficient: .31, t=3.61, p<.001), chairperson leadership efficacy (coefficient: .21, 
t=2.51, p<.05), and board members’ knowledge (coefficient: .20, t=2.40, p<.05) 
respectively showing the greatest effects on strategy involvement. Thus, hypotheses 
1-3 are supported. The interaction between CEO duality and the chairperson’s 
leadership efficacy is introduced in Model IV. The interaction effect is positive 
(coefficient: .15, t=1.97, p<.10) and hypothesis 4 is supported, albeit not as strongly 
as hypotheses 1-3. The impact of a recent change in board membership is considered 
in Model V and the significant negative coefficient (-.16, t=-2.16, p<.05) indicates 
support for hypothesis 5. Finally, Model VI includes the interaction between a recent 
change in board membership and the chairperson’s leadership efficacy. Here, the 
results indicate that chairperson leadership efficacy positively moderates the negative 
impact of recent changes in board composition (coefficient: .17, t=2.09, p<.05) and 
thus hypothesis 6 is supported. As evident from table 2, all models show significant F-
signs (with the exception of model I and II including controls) and adjusted R2 range 
from .27 (model III) to .36 (model VI). Further, the most significant F-changes are 
those passing from model II to model III (15.19***), indicating the relevance of board 
leadership variables. Additionally, the F-changes for the interaction models are 
significant for all the changes displayed in the table. As table 3 shows, all six 
hypotheses were fully supported, although with different levels of significance. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this article was to explore how board leadership in small firms 
contributes to board strategy involvement. We have used an empirical setting from 
Norway to investigate what makes boards in small firms involved in strategy. Our 
findings have both implications for theory and for practice, and they provide support 
for the use of team production theory when studying boards. To this end, we will start 
discussing the importance of leadership in board research, before going on to argue 
how evidence from this study may have implications for boards and managers. 
   
Board Strategy Involvem nt in Small Firms: Leadership Matters 
We have in this article contributed to the debate about boards in small firms by 
investigating how board leadership affects boards’ strategy involvement. Extant 
research in small firms has rarely investigated determinants of strategy involvement of 
boards, despite its acknowledged significance for small firms’ performance (Fiegener, 
2005). Even fewer studies have investigated leadership in small firm boards, and 
those tended to focus on structural leadership characteristics (Daily & Dalton, 1992, 
1993). Grounded in a team production perspective, we conceptualised board 
leadership as a multi-dimensional construct based on group processes and behaviors 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As we argued, effective board leadership from a team 
perspective requires both the presence and use of firm-relevant knowledge, which has 
been recognized as a key characteristic of team production in boards (Kaufman & 
Englander, 2005).  
 Consistent with our predictions, board members’ knowledge was shown to have a 
consistently significant impact on board strategy involvement. This is in line with 
theoretical arguments, according to which the presence of relevant knowledge at the 
Page 28 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 28 
board level is a determinant of board involvement in board tasks, including strategy 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The adoption of a team production perspective, however, 
suggests that the presence of board knowledge does not imply per se that board 
members will use their knowledge effectively (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & 
Zattoni, 2007). Rather, the creation of a process-oriented boardroom culture (Huse, 
Minichilli & Schoning, 2005) requires initiatives for board development to be in place 
(Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Board evaluations, board 
instructions and other board development programs are considered to be powerful 
tools to develop boards. The purpose of such practices is to better understand the 
challenges of the board work in each firm, facilitate for the board members to get to 
know each other and thereby enhance the work of the board as a group. Few studies 
have empirically shown this impact, especially in small firms. Among the few 
exceptions, Gabrielsson & Winlund (2000) in their study of Swedish small and 
medium-sized firms investigated the relationship between formal board evaluations 
and the boards’ service and control involvement, although with inconclusive results. 
The investigation of board leadership led us also to indicate board chairperson 
leadership efficacy as a determinant of constructive team production in the 
boardroom. As other scholars have already emphasized in theoretical reviews, the 
chairperson’s leadership efficacy can be a determinant of engaged boards (Leblanc, 
2005) and our findings provide empirical support. In this perspective, the chairperson 
is expected to lead other board members in order to develop their cooperative attitude 
and coalesce the team around common goals and outcomes. This approach goes 
beyond a more narrow view of leadership that suggests the duties of the board chair 
are those of hiring, firing and compensating top managers (Coles & Hesterly, 2000). 
Rather, it portrays the board chairperson as the most critical person in the boardroom 
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who integrates knowledge and develops initiatives to engage board members in team 
dynamics thus securing effective board leadership. This is in line with a strategic and 
transformational leadership view of corporate actors which ‘glorifies’ powerful 
leaders as opposed to assumptions of the agency theory which ‘vilify’ these (Cannella 
& Monroe, 1997). Along this line, the importance of chairperson leadership efficacy 
for board strategy involvement is more evident when considering firms with CEO 
duality. These results are also consistent with what we found for firms experiencing a 
recent change in board composition: rather than focusing on how a marginal change in 
an inside vis-à-vis outside board member composition influences firm performance, 
the team production perspective emphasizes how board leadership matters in securing 
transitions in team composition. 
In summary, we have demonstrated that conceptualizing board leadership as a 
behavioral and process-based phenomenon has greater explanatory power for small 
firm boards’ strategy involvement than structural leadership characteristics alone. Our 
findings contribute to the emerging body of knowledge on process-based board 
research (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) by 
shedding new light on the concept of board leadership in a small firm context. Whilst 
such leadership in governance may be especially visible and impactful in small firms, 
our novel theoretical approach also opens new avenues for board research in general. 
 
Implications for Theory: Team Production 
We proposed the team production perspective of the firm as a theoretical lens for 
studying board leadership. Rather than viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts 
between principals and agents, with the board tasked with monitoring management on 
behalf of shareholders, team production theory views the firm as a nexus of firm-
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specific investments with the board acting as the mediating hierarch to control 
shirking, resolve decision-making and encourage firm-specific investments which all 
further team production and value creation (Blair & Stout, 1999).  
 Whilst Blair & Stout (1999) developed team production theory at the level of the 
public corporation, and Kaufman & Englander (2005) indicated its utility for 
understanding boards, we used the logic of team production theory to investigate the 
determinants of small firm boards’ strategy involvement. We demonstrated that team 
production theory can contribute to our understanding of board behavior in several 
ways. First, at the centre of team production is the board team and the outputs 
generated by the team, rather than individual directors and their distinctive roles (viz. 
executive and non-executive). Whilst there have been important contributions to the 
study of teams in both small business and corporate governance research (Castro et 
al., 2009; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; West, 2007), rarely have these been explicitly 
grounded in team production theory (Gabrielsson et al., 2007). We argue that team 
production theory provides a complementary theoretical anchor for further conceptual 
and empirical work at the level of the board team.  
 Second, in parallel to the team focus, team production theory advances the notion 
of the mediating hierarch as a means to stimulate team production and resolve 
decision-making ambiguities (Blair & Stout, 1999). In governance research, this 
allows for the simultaneous exploration of the board team and board chairperson 
behaviors. As our findings have shown, board members’ knowledge and skills, board 
development and chairperson efficacy together had the greatest explanatory power for 
variations in strategic involvement. Team production theory advances existing studies 
on the interdependencies of strategic leaders, such as the one by Daily & Schwenk 
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(1996), by its ability to model processes and behaviors related to leadership rather 
than structural leadership conditions alone, as we discussed above.  
 Finally, our theoretical approach is complementary to perspectives such as 
strategic choice (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), resource/competence-based views (Zahra 
et al., 2006) and resource dependency theory (Gabrielsson, 2007) in its emphasis on 
firm value creation (Huse, 2007). Rather than prioritizing a single actor, as agency 
theory does in respect of shareholder value, team production theory has at its core the 
value of the firm per se and recognizes that such value is created by all firm 
participants, including but not exclusive to shareholders, through the productive use of 
their firm-specific investm nts. For board research, team production theory provides 
an additional theoretical justification for evaluating board performance through its 
strategic involvement (Pettigrew, 1992; Stiles, 2001). 
 We argued that the small firm setting is a particularly pertinent one for testing 
predictions from team production theory because of  small firm characteristics 
including overlapping governance structures, lack of functional managerial 
competence, strong owner representation in the boardroom and the prevalent internal 
wealth creation focus (Brunninge et al., 2007; Cowling, 2003). However, as a 
theoretical lens team production theory may also be useful for studies of the large firm 
setting and may provide fresh insights into antecedents and consequences of 
leadership in different governance structures and systems. For example, studies of 
family businesses in different empirical settings have identified the need to study 
actor behaviors where non-financial goals are important and not just financial 
shareholder value (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza Kintana, 2010; Zellweger, 
Nason, Nordqvist & Brush, 2010), and evidence from international governance 
research highlights the variety of firm goal orientations (Weimer & Pape, 1999). 
Page 32 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 32 
Team production theory may bring us closer to understanding governance phenomena 
is such contexts, since it allows a focus on a wider understanding of value creation. 
 
Implications for Practice 
The article has various implications for small firm owners, board members and 
managers. First, given that board members’ firm-relevant knowledge has such a high 
influence on boards’ strategy involvement, the selection of outside board members 
becomes critical. As such, the assessment of board knowledge should be the 
mechanism through which owners of small firms make sure that individual knowledge 
is present, and that it is collectively used by board members through a process of 
continuous development and learning. Further, it is important also to assess the fit of 
board members’ knowledge with the requirements of the firm’s competitive 
environment, as well as the fit of such collective knowledge with the firm’s critical 
technologies and key products and markets. 
 A second implication for practice relates to the importance of continuously 
developing boards in order to create value for firms. Along this line, a belief in the 
value of board development initiatives permeates most codes of good corporate 
governance practice (e.g. Higgs, 2003). Board evaluations represent a formal routine 
that can facilitate a process-oriented boardroom culture (Minichilli et al., 2007). 
Having such an evaluation system enables a more regular and systematic follow-up of 
board members’ contributions to different board tasks, making it easier to detect 
inefficiencies and to improve the board work (Lorsch, 1995). It can also help clarify 
the expectations from each board member and collectively agree the boards’ mandate. 
The role of regular board development initiatives, such as occasional longer meetings, 
away-days and training seminars for board members is included in several recent 
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codes of best practice and promoted by many corporate governance experts (e.g. 
MacAvoy & Millstein, 1998).  
 Although the idea of board development initiatives is not new (cf. Cadbury, 1992), 
small firms have been traditionally excluded from the debate on board practices, and 
studies on the cross-national convergence of best practices regarding board 
functioning traditionally focused on large listed corporations (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004). Board development in small firms has instead been limited for a long 
time to bringing an external member on the board. Nevertheless, the importance of the 
actual board practices is gaining importance also in small firms, and we may expect 
relevant developments in the near future.  
 Finally, owners of small firms should also consider the importance of identifying a 
strong leadership inside the boardroom. With respect to this, scholars have noted the 
pivotal role of the chairperson in establishing a process-oriented board climate that 
stimulates discussion and motivates all board members to use their knowledge and 
skills in the board’s work (Huse, 2005). This study empirically reinforces such 
theoretical predictions, and suggests to owners and board members that effective 
leadership has a strong impact on board involvement, and particularly on strategy 
involvement. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Various directions for further research are possible. First, our results emphasize how 
certain board working structures and process-oriented boardroom dynamics deserve 
further research efforts. A potentially fruitful line of inquiry may be to link research in 
the board process tradition with that of the literature on team and entrepreneurial 
learning (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes & Hitt, 2009; Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 2005). 
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This may shed further light on how well and how quickly new knowledge is 
transferred and used in small firms. Second, a cross-sectional associative research 
design was chosen, although we used observations through a time-window. Further 
studies should include longitudinal designs, even if the collection of primary data 
from CEOs and/or chairpersons longitudinally might be quite complex, as our initial 
attempts have shown. Third, the CEOs were the respondents of the main survey in this 
study. The results are, as most other survey studies about boards, biased in favor of 
CEO perceptions, especially regarding his/her perceptions of the leadership efficacy 
of the chairperson. In the small number of cases where CEO/chairperson roles were 
combined, the chairperson leadership efficacy measure is in effect a self-rated one and 
our findings in respect of hypothesis 4 need to be treated with particular caution.  
Future studies may also include observations from other board respondents order to 
validate measures on sub-samples.  
 Finally, our study is based on 140 firms in Norway. As we already discussed, the 
number of firms significantly reduced when considering responses for both time 
periods (2004 and 2005) from identical firms, and the challenge is to increase the 
number of observations when simultaneously using multiple answers from the same 
firms in different time periods.  Although the Norwegian governance context has 
many similarities to other countries (Zhang, 2010), there are also differences most 
notably the regulatory framework, the prevalence of active small firm boards and 
concentrated ownership structures (Randoy and Goel, 2003). These specificities of the 
Norwegian context made it a particularly useful empirical setting for our research. 
However, even though our measures are similar to those from studies in other 
European contexts (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) and our 
findings resonate with studies elsewhere, including Anglo-American countries (Demb 
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& Neubauer, 1992; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Leblanc, 2005; Stiles, 2001), there is a 
need for further research in different empirical settings in order to generalize results.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We have explored how board leadership in small firms may contribute to board 
strategy involvement. We acknowledge that our study has limitations in respect of its 
single country setting, the use of CEO responses, and the limited two year observation 
window. Nevertheless, in taking a novel theoretical approach, we have made an initial 
contribution to knowledge on the impact of behavioral aspects of board leadership on 
strategy involvement in small firms. Hypotheses about board members’ knowledge, 
board development and board chairperson leadership behaviors were supported. We 
also provided evidence that board chairperson leadership is of particular importance 
under contingent situations, and specifically in firms with CEO duality and following 
a change in board composition. Our study has implications both for theory and 
practice, indicating how complementary theoretical approaches, such as the team 
production theory of the firm, may explain more than traditional board composition 
and independence models in the context of small firms. Along this line, we provided 
several suggestions for small business owners and managers who may benefit from 
strategic involvement of their boards of directors. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aguilera, R.V. & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2004. Codes of good governance worldwide: 
What is the trigger? Organization Studies, 25(3): 415-443. 
Alchian, A.A. & Demsetz, H. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic 
organization. American Economic Review, 62: 777-795. 
Page 36 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 36 
Anderson, C.A. & Anthony, R.N. 1986.The new corporate directors. New York: 
John Wiley.  
Arthurs, J. D., Busenitz, L. W., Hoskisson, R. E., & Johnson, R. A. 2009. Firm-
specific human capital and governance in IPO firms: Addressing agency and 
resource dependence concerns. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 33(4): 
845-865. 
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. 1990. The composition of boards of directors and 
strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management 
Review, 15(1): 72-87. 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C.C., Gomez-Mejia, L. & Larraza Kintana, M. (2010) Socio-
emotional wealth and corporate response to institutional pressures: Do family-
controlled firms pollute less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 
(forthcoming). 
Blair, M. & Stout, L.A. 1999. A team production theory of corporate law. Virginia 
Law Review, 85: 247-328. 
Blair, M. M. 2005. Institutionalists, neoclassicals and team production. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 43(4): 605-616. 
Boeker, W. 1989. Strategic change: The effects of founding and history, Academy of 
Management Journal, 32(3): 489-515  
Boeker, W. 1997. Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics and 
organisational growth. Academy of Management Journal, 40(1): 152-170.  
Borch, O.J. & Huse, M. 1993. Informal strategic networks and the board of directors. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18(1): 23-36. 
Brundin, E. & Nordqvist, M. 2008. Beyond facts and figures: The role of emotions in 
boardroom dynamics. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
16(4),:326-341. 
Brunninge, O., Nordqvist, M. & Wiklund, J. 2007. Corporate governance and 
strategic change in SMEs: The effects of ownership, board structure and top 
management teams. Small Business Economics, 29(3): 295-308. 
Cannella, A.A. & Monroe, M.J. 1997. Contrasting perspectives on strategic leaders: 
Toward a more realistic view of top managers. Journal of Management, 23(3): 
213-237.  
Page 37 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 37 
Carpenter, M.A. & Westphal, J.D. 2001. The strategic context of external network 
ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in 
strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 639-660.  
Carpenter, M.A., Pollock, T.G. & Leary, M.M. 2003. Testing a model of reasoned 
risk-taking: Governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global 
strategy in high-technology IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 
803-820. 
Castro, C.B., de la Concha, M.D., Gravel, J.V. & Perinan, M.M.V. 2009. Does the 
team leverage the board’s decisions? Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(6):744-761. 
Certo, S.T., Covin, J.G., Daily, C.M. & Dalton, D.R. 2001. Wealth and the effects of 
founder management among IPO-stage new ventures, Strategic Management 
Journal, 22: 641-658.  
Certo, S. T., Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. 2001. Signaling firm value through board 
structure: An investigation of initial public offerings, Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, 26(2): 33-50. 
Chahine, S. & Tohme, N.S. 2010. Is Ceo duality always negative? An exploration of 
CEO duality and ownership structure in the Arab IPO context, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(2): 123-141. 
Coles, J., & Hesterly, W. 2000. Independence of the chairman and board composition. 
Firm choices and shareholder value, Journal of Management, 26: 195-214. 
Collis, D.J. 1994. Research note: how valuable are organizational capabilities? 
Strategic Management Journal, 15: 143-152. 
Conger, J.A., Finegold, D. & Lawler, E.E 1998. Appraising boardroom performance, 
Harvard Business Review, 136-148. 
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top 
management compensation, Academy of Management Journal, 41(2): 146-
157. 
Cowling, M. 2003. Productivity and corporate governance in smaller firms, Small 
Business Economics, 20: 335-344.  
Daily, C.M., & Dalton, D.R. 1992. The relationship between governance structure and 
corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms, Journal of Business Venturing, 
7: 375-386.  
Page 38 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 38 
Daily, C.M. & Dalton, D.R. 1993. Board of directors leadership and structure: Control 
and performance implications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 17: 65-
81. 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R. & Cannella Jr., A.A 2003. Corporate governance: Decades 
of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28: 371-382.  
Daily, C.M., McDougall, P.P., Covin, J.G., & Dalton, D.R. 2002. Governance and 
strategic leadership in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management, 15(5): 1–
28. 
Daily, C.M., Schwenk, C. 1996. Chief executive officers, top management teams, and 
boards of directors: Congruent or countervailing forces. Journal of 
Management, 22(2): 185-208 
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E., & Johnson, J.L. 1998. Meta-analytic 
reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, 19: 269-290. 
Davis, P.S. & Pett, T.L. 2000. Governance and goal formation among family 
business: A resource dependency perspective. The International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 1: 137-149. 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. & Donaldson, L. 1997 Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1): 20-47. 
Demb, A. & Neubauer, F.F. 1992. The corporate board: Confronting the paradoxes. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dess, G. G., Lumpkin, G. T., & McGee, J. E. 1999. Linking corporate 
entrepreneurship to strategy, structure, and process: Suggested research 
directions. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 23(3): 85-102. 
Doty, D.R. & Glick, W.H. 1998. Common methods bias: Does common methods 
variance really bias results? Organizational Research Methods, 1(4): 374-406. 
Dillman, D.A. 2000. Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method, New 
York: John Wiley.  
Dulewicz, V., Gay, K., & Taylor, B. 2007. What makes an outstanding chairman? 
Findings from the UK non-executive director of the year awards, 2006. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6): 1056-1069. 
Eddleston, K. A. 2008. Commentary: The prequel to family firm culture and 
stewardship: The leadership perspective of the founder. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, 32(6): 1055-1061. 
Page 39 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 39 
European Union 2003. Definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (Official Journal L 
124 of 20.05.2003), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enterprise/business_environment/n260
26_en.htm, last accessed 24th October 2010 
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26: 301-325. 
Fiegener, M.K. 2005. Determinants of board participation in the strategic decisions of 
small corporations. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(5): 627-650.  
Fiegener, M.K., Brown, B.M., Dreux, D.R. & Dennis, W.J. Jr. 2000a. The adoption of 
outside boards by small private US firms. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, 12: 291-309.   
Fiegener, M. K., Brown, B. M., Dreux, D. R., & Dennis, W. J. 2000b. CEO stakes and 
board composition in small private firms. Entrepreneurship: Theory & 
Practice, 24(4): 5-24. 
Finkelstein, S. & D’Aveni, R.A. 1994. CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How 
boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(5): 1079-1108.  
Finkelstein, S. & Mooney, A.C. 2003. Not the usual suspect: How to use the board 
process to make boards better. Academy of Management Executive, 17(2): 101-
113.  
Forbes, D.P. & Milliken, F.J. 1999. Cognition and corporate governance: 
Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. 
Academy of Management Review, 24: 489-505. 
Fowler, F.J. 1993. Survey research methods, Newbury Park: Sage. 
Furr, R.M., & Furr, L.J. 2005. Is your chairman a leader? Corporate Board, 26(154): 
11-15. 
Gabrielsson, J. 2007. Correlates of board empowerment in small companies. 
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 31: 687-712. 
Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. 2004. Context, Behavior, and Evolution. International 
Studies of Management & Organization, 34(2): 11-36. 
Page 40 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 40 
Gabrielsson, J., Huse, M. & Minichilli, A. 2007. Understanding the leadership role of 
the board chairperson through a team production approach. International 
Journal of Leadership Studies, 3(1): 21-39. 
Gabrielsson, J. & Winlund, H. 2000. Boards of directors in small and medium-sized 
industrial firms: The importance of board member activity and working style on 
board task performance. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12(4): 
311-330. 
Golden, B.R. & Zajac, E.J. 2001. When will boards influence strategy? Inclination x 
Power = Strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1087-1111. 
Hambrick, D.C., von Werder, A. & Zajac, E.J. 2008. New directions in corporate 
governance research. Organization Science, 19: 381-385. 
Haynes, K.T. & Hillman, A. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1145-1163. 
Hillman, A. & Dalziel, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management 
Review, 28: 383-396. 
Hitt, M. A., Harrison, J. S., & Ireland, R. D. 2001. Mergers and acquisitions: A guide 
to creating value for stakeholders. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Holcomb, T. R., Ireland, R. D., Holmes Jr, R. M., & Hitt, M. A. 2009. Architecture of 
entrepreneurial learning: Exploring the link among heuristics, knowledge, and 
action. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 33(1): 167-192. 
Huse, M. 1990. Board composition in small enterprises. Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, 2: 363-373 
Huse, M. 2000. Boards of directors in SMEs: A review and research agenda. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12(4): 271-290. 
Huse, M. 2005. Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for 
exploring behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of 
Management, 16: S65-79. 
Huse, M. 2007. Boards, governance and value creation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Huse, M., Minichilli, A. & Schoning, M. 2005. Corporate boards as assets for 
operating in the new Europe: The value of process-oriented boardroom 
dynamics. Organizational Dynamics, 34(3): 285-297 
Page 41 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 41 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 
305-360. 
Johannisson, B. & Huse, M. 2000. Recruiting outside board members in the small 
family business: An ideological challenge. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, 12(4): 353-378.  
Judge Jr, W. Q., & Zeithaml, C. P. 1992. Institutional and strategic choice 
perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision process. Academy 
of Management Journal, 35(4): 766-794. 
Kaufman, A., & Englander, E. 2005. A team production model of corporate 
governance. Academy of Management Executive, 19(3): 9-22. 
Kim, B., Burns, M. & Prescott, J.E. 2009. The strategic role of the board: The impact 
of board structure on top management team strategic action capability. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (6): 728-743. 
Kosnik, R.D. 1987. Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate 
governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 163-185. 
Kumar, N., Stern, L.W., & Anderson, J.C. 1993. Conducting interorganizational 
research using key informants. Academy of Management Journal, 36(6): 1633-
1651.  
Leblanc, R. & Gillies, J. 2005. Inside the boardroom. How boards really work and 
the coming revolution in corporate governance, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons 
Canada.  
Leblanc, R. 2005. Assessing board leadership. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13: 654-666. 
Letendre, L. 2004. The dynamics of the boardroom. Academy of Management 
Executive, 18: 101–104.  
Lindell, M. & Whitney, D.J. 2001. Accounting for common method variance in cross-
sectional research designs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1): 114-121.  
Long, T. 2008. Diving for pearls: the importance of board induction and re-induction. 
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 4(1): 40-50. 
Lorsch, J.W. 1995. Empowering the board, Harvard Business Review, January-
February: 107-117. 
Page 42 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 42 
Lumpkin, G. T., & Lichtenstein, B. B. 2005. The role of organizational learning in the 
opportunity-recognition process. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 
29(4): 451-472. 
Lynall, M.D., Golden B.R. & Hillman, A.J. 2003. Board composition from 
adolescence to maturity: A multitheoretic view. Academy of Management 
Review, 28: 416-431. 
MacAvoy, P., & Millstein, I. 2003. The recurrent crisis in corporate governance. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mallette, P. & Fowler, K.L. 1992. Effects of board composition and stock ownership 
on the adoption of poison pills. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 1010-
1035.  
McNulty, T. & Pettigrew, A. 1999. Strategist on the board. Organization Studies, 20: 
47-74. 
Minichilli, A., & Hansen, C. 2007. The board advisory tasks in small firms and the 
event of crisis. Journal of Management and Governance, 11(1): 5–22. 
Minichilli, A., Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M., 2007. Board evaluations: making a fit 
between the purpose and the system. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(4): 609-622. 
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A. & Zona, F. 2009. Making boards effective: An empirical 
examination of board task performance. British Journal of Management, 20: 
55–74. 
Muth, M.M., Donaldson, L. 1998. Stewardship theory and board structure: a 
contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1): 
5-28. 
Nelson, T. 2003. The persistence founder influence: Management, ownership, and 
performance effects at initial public offering. Strategic Management Journal, 
24: 707-724. 
Neter, J., Kutner, M.H., Nachtsheim, C.J. & Wasserman, W. 1996. Applied linear 
statistical models. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
NUES (2010) The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance, October 
2010 revision issued by the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, 
http://www.nues.no/English/The_Norwegian_Code_of_Practice_for_Corporate_
Governance/, last accessed 29th November 2010. 
Page 43 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 43 
Pearce, J.A. & Zahra, S.A. 1991. The relative power of CEOs and boards of 
directors: Associations with corporate performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 12: 235-153.  
Pettigrew, A.M. 1992. On studying managerial elites. Strategic Management 
Journal, 13: 163–82. 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.Y., & Podsakoff, N.P. 2003. Common 
method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88: 879-903.  
Pugliese, A. & Wenstøp, P. 2007. Board members’ contribution to strategic decision 
making in small firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 11(4): 383-
404. 
Pugliese, A., Bezemer, P., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., Van Den Bosch, F.A.J., & Volberda, 
H.W. 2009. Boards of directors’ contribution to strategy: A literature review and 
research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 292–
306. 
Randoy, T & Goel, S. 2003. Ownership structure, founder leadership, and 
performance in Norwegian SMEs: Implications for financing entrepreneurial 
opportunities, Journal of Business Venturing, 18(5): 619-637. 
Rechner, P.L. & Dalton, D.R. 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: a 
longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2): 155-160. 
Rindova, V. 1999. What do corporate boards have to do with strategy: A cognitive 
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 36: 953-977.  
Roberts, J., McNulty, T. & Stiles, P. 2005. Beyond agency conceptions of the work of 
the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British 
Journal of Management, 16: S5–S26. 
Sandberg, W. R. 1992. Strategic Management's Potential Contributions to a Theory of 
Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 16(3): 73-90. 
Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. 2003. Toward a theory of agency and 
altruism in family firms.  Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4): 473-490. 
Shen, W. 2003, The dynamics of the CEO-Board relationship: An evolutionary 
perspective. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 466-476. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance, 52(2): 737-783. 
Page 44 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 44 
Stiles, P. 2001. The impact of the board on strategy: An empirical examination. 
Journal of Management Studies, 38(5): 627-650. 
Stiles P. & Taylor B. 2001. Boards at work. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Stinchcombe, A.L. 1965. Organizations and social structure, in J.G. March (Ed.), 
Handbook of Organizations: 142-193. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Tuggle, C.S., Sirmon, D.G., Reutzel, C.R. & Bierman, L. 2010. Commanding board 
of director attention: investigating how organizational performance and CEO 
duality affect board members’ attention to monitoring, Strategic Management 
Journal, 31(9): 946-968. 
Uhlaner, L., Floren, R.H. & Geerlings, J.R. 2007. Owner commitment and relational 
governance in the privately-held firm: An empirical study. Small Business 
Economics, 29(3): 275-293. 
Uhlaner, L., Wright, M. & Huse, M. 2007. Private firms and corporate governance: 
An integrated economic and management perspective, Small Business 
Economics, 29: 225-241. 
Van den Heuvel, J., Van Gils, A. & Voordeckers, W. 2005. Board roles in small and 
medium sized family businesses. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13: 467–83.  
Van Ees, H., van der Laan, G., & Postma, T.J.B.M. 2008. Effective board behavior in 
The Netherlands. European Management Journal, 26: 84-93.  
Weimer, J. & Pape, J.C 1999. A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review. 7(2): 152-166. 
West, G. P. 2007. Collective cognition: When entrepreneurial teams, not individuals, 
make decisions. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 31(1): 77-102. 
Westphal, J. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director 
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. 
Strategic Management Journal, 22(12): 1113-1137. 
Wu, J. B., Tsui, A. S., & Kinicki, A. J. 2010. Consequences of differentiated 
leadership on groups. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1): 90-106. 
Zahra, S.A. & Filatotchev, I. 2004. Governance of the entrepreneurial threshold firm: 
A knowledge-based perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 41(5): 883-
895. 
Page 45 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 45 
Zahra, S., Filatotchev, I. & Wright, M. 2009. How do threshold firms sustain 
corporate entrepreneurship? The role of boards and absorptive capacity. Journal 
of Business Venturing, 24: 248-260. 
Zahra, S.A., Neubaum, D.O. & Huse, M. 2000. Entrepreneurship in medium-sized 
companies: Exploring the effects of ownership and governance systems. 
Journal of Management, 26(5): 947 976.  
Zahra, S.A. & Pearce, J. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15: 
291–334. 
Zahra, S.A., Sapienza, H.J. & Davidsson, P. 2006. Entrepreneurship and dynamic 
capabilities: A review, model and research agenda. Journal of Management 
Studies, 43(4): 917-955. 
Zattoni, A., & Cuomo, F. 2010. How independent, competent and incentivized should 
Non-executive directors be? An empirical investigation of good governance 
codes. British Journal of Management, 21(1): 63-79. 
Zellweger, T.M., Nason, R.S., Nordqvist, M. & Brush, C.G. 2010. Why do family 
firms strive for non-financial goals? An organizational identity perspective. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, (forthcoming). 
Zhang, P. 2010. Board information and strategic task performance, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18(5): 473-487. 
Zona, F., & Zattoni, A. 2007. Beyond the black box of demography: Board processes 
and task effectiveness within Italian firms, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(5): 852-864.  
Page 46 of 49
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 46 
 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for Relevant Variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
High tech firm  .00 1.00 .25 .43 
Size (Number of employees) 5.00 50.00 22.35 15.83 
Size (ln employees) 1.60 3.93 2.80 .99 
Revenues (Million NOK) .09 1600.00 80.49 142.57 
Firm age .00 162.00 30.91 31.72 
Firm age (Ln) .00 5.09 2.95 1.01 
Firm is the HQ .00 1.00 .40 .49 
CEO ownership .00 100.00 22.81 32.59 
CEO tenure .00 45.00 7.36 6.45 
Number of board members  3.00 10.00 4.41 1.33 
Board Size (Ln N of members) 1.10 2.30 1.44 .28 
Insider ratio .00 1.00 .33 .31 
Shareholder ratio .00 1.00 .42 .37 
CEO duality  .00 1.00 .09 .28 
Board members’ knowledge (04-
05) 
1.96 5.00 4.12 .57 
Board development (04-05) 1.00 5.00 2.74 .85 
Chair efficacy (04-05) 1.00 6.00 4.32 .93 
Change in board membership .00 1.00 .27 .44 
Strategy Involvement 2005 1.00 7.00 4.94 1.48 
     
Valid N (listwise) 140    
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TABLE 2. Correlation Analysis 
 
 Mean St.dev. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1. Hi-tech firm .25 .43 1               
2. Firm size (Ln 
employees) 
2.79 .99 .08 1              
3. Firm age 2.95 1.01 -.02 .33** 1             
4. Firm is the HQ .40 .49 -.06 -.06 .16** 1            
5. CEO ownership 22.81 32.59 -.05 -.04 .03 .41** 1           
6. CEO tenure 7.36 6.44 -.07 .14** .29** .06 .26** 1          
7. Number of board 
members (Ln) 
1.44 .28 -.02 .06 .10* -.25** -.22** .03 1         
8. Insider ratio .32 .31 -.01 .01 -.05 .05 .16* .05 -.25** 1        
9. Shareholder ratio .45 .41 .00 -.12* -.03 .18** .28** .04 -.12* .16* 1       
10. CEO duality .09 .28 -.06 -.08 .01 .08 .21** .03 -.04 .07 .24** 1      
11. Board members’ 
knowledge  
4.11 .57 .08 .02 -.00 .15* .22** .08 -.29** .21** .09 .14* 1     
12. Board development  2.74 .86 -.01 .29** .22** .02 .02 .15* .10 -.06 -.16* -.04 .17* 1    
13. Chair leadership 
efficacy 
4.32 .93 .00 .04 .12 .01 -.01 .06 -.00 -.13 -.11 .03 .24** .37** 1   
14.Change in board 
membership 
.27 .44 .05 -.03 .01 .03 -.06 -.04 .09 -.03 -.05 -.03 .02 .03 .04 1  
15. Strategy 
Involvement 
4.94 1.47 .06 .02 .02 .02 -.02 .09 -.00 -.11 -.03 .02 .25** .39** .36** -.04 1 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. 1-tailed: *< 0.05; **< 0.01, N=140 
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TABLE 3.  Regression Analyses for Strategy Involvement 2005 
 
 
Standardized Beta coefficients  
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
Model IV 
 
Model V 
 
Model VI 
 
Firm and CEO characteristics 
      
Hi-tech firm .17* .17† .12 .14† .12 .11 
Firm size (Ln employees) .09 .08 -.00 -.00 -.01 .00 
Firm age .05 .05 -.03 -.02 -.05 -.08 
Firm is the HQ .11 .11 .11 .09 .13 .12 
CEO ownership 
-.18† -.15 -.16† -.16† -.18* -.18* 
CEO tenure .13 .13 .05 .06 .06 .06 
 
Board demographics 
      
Number of board members (Ln)  -.07 -.01 -.02 .01 -.01 
Insider ratio  -.11 -.10 -.11 -.07 -.09 
Shareholder ratio  -.07 -.06 -.08 
-.15† -.16* 
CEO duality  -.08 -.09 -.06 
-.13† -.13† 
 
Board Leadership 
      
H1 Board members’ knowledge (04-05)   .20* .21** .27*** .25** 
H2 Board development  (04-05)   .31*** .30*** .31*** .29*** 
H3 Chairperson leadership efficacy (04-05)   .21* .19* .22** .17* 
       
Interactions  
(Chair leadership quality) 
      
H4 Chair leadership efficacy*CEO duality    .15*   
       
H5 Change in board membership     -.16* -.19** 
H6 Chair leadership efficacy*Change in board       .17* 
       
 
R 
 
.08 
 
.10 
 
.34 
 
.39 
 
.41 
 
.43 
Adj R2 .03 .03 .27 .29 .34 .36 
F (sign) Full model 1.82† 1.44 4.99*** 5.02*** 5.99*** 6.04*** 
F change 1.82† .89 15.19*** 3.89* 4.65* 4.37* 
N= 140 140 140 140 136 136 
+ = .10-level ,* = .05-level, ** = .01-level, ***= .001-level. 
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